exception to wait for reading. see IO.select.
exception to wait for writing. see IO.select.
Provides classes and methods to request, create and validate RFC3161-compliant timestamps. Request may be used to either create requests from scratch or to parse existing requests that again can be used to request timestamps from a timestamp server, e.g. via the net/http. The resulting timestamp response may be parsed using Response.
Please note that Response is read-only and immutable. To create a Response, an instance of Factory as well as a valid Request are needed.
#Assumes ts.p12 is a PKCS#12-compatible file with a private key #and a certificate that has an extended key usage of 'timeStamping' p12 = OpenSSL::PKCS12.new(File.binread('ts.p12'), 'pwd') md = OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA1') hash = md.digest(data) #some binary data to be timestamped req = OpenSSL::Timestamp::Request.new req.algorithm = 'SHA1' req.message_imprint = hash req.policy_id = "1.2.3.4.5" req.nonce = 42 fac = OpenSSL::Timestamp::Factory.new fac.gen_time = Time.now fac.serial_number = 1 timestamp = fac.create_timestamp(p12.key, p12.certificate, req)
#Assume we have a timestamp token in a file called ts.der
ts = OpenSSL::Timestamp::Response.new(File.binread('ts.der'))
#Assume we have the Request for this token in a file called req.der
req = OpenSSL::Timestamp::Request.new(File.binread('req.der'))
# Assume the associated root CA certificate is contained in a
# DER-encoded file named root.cer
root = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new(File.binread('root.cer'))
# get the necessary intermediate certificates, available in
# DER-encoded form in inter1.cer and inter2.cer
inter1 = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new(File.binread('inter1.cer'))
inter2 = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new(File.binread('inter2.cer'))
ts.verify(req, root, inter1, inter2) -> ts or raises an exception if validation fails
The WIN32OLE::VariantType module includes constants of VARIANT type constants. The constants is used when creating WIN32OLE::Variant object.
obj = WIN32OLE::Variant.new("2e3", WIN32OLE::VARIANT::VT_R4) obj.value # => 2000.0
This module has all methods of FileUtils module, but never changes files/directories. This equates to passing the :noop flag to methods in FileUtils.
Logging severity.
This module is responsible for converting the prism syntax tree into other syntax trees.
The Gem::Security implements cryptographic signatures for gems. The section below is a step-by-step guide to using signed gems and generating your own.
In order to start signing your gems, you’ll need to build a private key and a self-signed certificate. Here’s how:
# build a private key and certificate for yourself: $ gem cert --build you@example.com
This could take anywhere from a few seconds to a minute or two, depending on the speed of your computer (public key algorithms aren’t exactly the speediest crypto algorithms in the world). When it’s finished, you’ll see the files “gem-private_key.pem” and “gem-public_cert.pem” in the current directory.
First things first: Move both files to ~/.gem if you don’t already have a key and certificate in that directory. Ensure the file permissions make the key unreadable by others (by default the file is saved securely).
Keep your private key hidden; if it’s compromised, someone can sign packages as you (note: PKI has ways of mitigating the risk of stolen keys; more on that later).
In RubyGems 2 and newer there is no extra work to sign a gem. RubyGems will automatically find your key and certificate in your home directory and use them to sign newly packaged gems.
If your certificate is not self-signed (signed by a third party) RubyGems will attempt to load the certificate chain from the trusted certificates. Use gem cert --add signing_cert.pem to add your signers as trusted certificates. See below for further information on certificate chains.
If you build your gem it will automatically be signed. If you peek inside your gem file, you’ll see a couple of new files have been added:
$ tar tf your-gem-1.0.gem metadata.gz metadata.gz.sig # metadata signature data.tar.gz data.tar.gz.sig # data signature checksums.yaml.gz checksums.yaml.gz.sig # checksums signature
If you wish to store your key in a separate secure location you’ll need to set your gems up for signing by hand. To do this, set the signing_key and cert_chain in the gemspec before packaging your gem:
s.signing_key = '/secure/path/to/gem-private_key.pem' s.cert_chain = %w[/secure/path/to/gem-public_cert.pem]
When you package your gem with these options set RubyGems will automatically load your key and certificate from the secure paths.
Now let’s verify the signature. Go ahead and install the gem, but add the following options: -P HighSecurity, like this:
# install the gem with using the security policy "HighSecurity" $ sudo gem install your.gem -P HighSecurity
The -P option sets your security policy – we’ll talk about that in just a minute. Eh, what’s this?
$ gem install -P HighSecurity your-gem-1.0.gem
ERROR: While executing gem ... (Gem::Security::Exception)
root cert /CN=you/DC=example is not trusted
The culprit here is the security policy. RubyGems has several different security policies. Let’s take a short break and go over the security policies. Here’s a list of the available security policies, and a brief description of each one:
NoSecurity - Well, no security at all. Signed packages are treated like unsigned packages.
LowSecurity - Pretty much no security. If a package is signed then RubyGems will make sure the signature matches the signing certificate, and that the signing certificate hasn’t expired, but that’s it. A malicious user could easily circumvent this kind of security.
MediumSecurity - Better than LowSecurity and NoSecurity, but still fallible. Package contents are verified against the signing certificate, and the signing certificate is checked for validity, and checked against the rest of the certificate chain (if you don’t know what a certificate chain is, stay tuned, we’ll get to that). The biggest improvement over LowSecurity is that MediumSecurity won’t install packages that are signed by untrusted sources. Unfortunately, MediumSecurity still isn’t totally secure – a malicious user can still unpack the gem, strip the signatures, and distribute the gem unsigned.
HighSecurity - Here’s the bugger that got us into this mess. The HighSecurity policy is identical to the MediumSecurity policy, except that it does not allow unsigned gems. A malicious user doesn’t have a whole lot of options here; they can’t modify the package contents without invalidating the signature, and they can’t modify or remove signature or the signing certificate chain, or RubyGems will simply refuse to install the package. Oh well, maybe they’ll have better luck causing problems for CPAN users instead :).
The reason RubyGems refused to install your shiny new signed gem was because it was from an untrusted source. Well, your code is infallible (naturally), so you need to add yourself as a trusted source:
# add trusted certificate gem cert --add ~/.gem/gem-public_cert.pem
You’ve now added your public certificate as a trusted source. Now you can install packages signed by your private key without any hassle. Let’s try the install command above again:
# install the gem with using the HighSecurity policy (and this time # without any shenanigans) $ gem install -P HighSecurity your-gem-1.0.gem Successfully installed your-gem-1.0 1 gem installed
This time RubyGems will accept your signed package and begin installing.
While you’re waiting for RubyGems to work it’s magic, have a look at some of the other security commands by running gem help cert:
Options:
-a, --add CERT Add a trusted certificate.
-l, --list [FILTER] List trusted certificates where the
subject contains FILTER
-r, --remove FILTER Remove trusted certificates where the
subject contains FILTER
-b, --build EMAIL_ADDR Build private key and self-signed
certificate for EMAIL_ADDR
-C, --certificate CERT Signing certificate for --sign
-K, --private-key KEY Key for --sign or --build
-A, --key-algorithm ALGORITHM Select key algorithm for --build from RSA, DSA, or EC. Defaults to RSA.
-s, --sign CERT Signs CERT with the key from -K
and the certificate from -C
-d, --days NUMBER_OF_DAYS Days before the certificate expires
-R, --re-sign Re-signs the certificate from -C with the key from -K
We’ve already covered the --build option, and the --add, --list, and --remove commands seem fairly straightforward; they allow you to add, list, and remove the certificates in your trusted certificate list. But what’s with this --sign option?
To answer that question, let’s take a look at “certificate chains”, a concept I mentioned earlier. There are a couple of problems with self-signed certificates: first of all, self-signed certificates don’t offer a whole lot of security. Sure, the certificate says Yukihiro Matsumoto, but how do I know it was actually generated and signed by matz himself unless he gave me the certificate in person?
The second problem is scalability. Sure, if there are 50 gem authors, then I have 50 trusted certificates, no problem. What if there are 500 gem authors? 1000? Having to constantly add new trusted certificates is a pain, and it actually makes the trust system less secure by encouraging RubyGems users to blindly trust new certificates.
Here’s where certificate chains come in. A certificate chain establishes an arbitrarily long chain of trust between an issuing certificate and a child certificate. So instead of trusting certificates on a per-developer basis, we use the PKI concept of certificate chains to build a logical hierarchy of trust. Here’s a hypothetical example of a trust hierarchy based (roughly) on geography:
--------------------------
| rubygems@rubygems.org |
--------------------------
|
-----------------------------------
| |
---------------------------- -----------------------------
| seattlerb@seattlerb.org | | dcrubyists@richkilmer.com |
---------------------------- -----------------------------
| | | |
--------------- ---------------- ----------- --------------
| drbrain | | zenspider | | pabs@dc | | tomcope@dc |
--------------- ---------------- ----------- --------------
Now, rather than having 4 trusted certificates (one for drbrain, zenspider, pabs@dc, and tomecope@dc), a user could actually get by with one certificate, the “rubygems@rubygems.org” certificate.
Here’s how it works:
I install “rdoc-3.12.gem”, a package signed by “drbrain”. I’ve never heard of “drbrain”, but his certificate has a valid signature from the “seattle.rb@seattlerb.org” certificate, which in turn has a valid signature from the “rubygems@rubygems.org” certificate. Voila! At this point, it’s much more reasonable for me to trust a package signed by “drbrain”, because I can establish a chain to “rubygems@rubygems.org”, which I do trust.
The --sign option allows all this to happen. A developer creates their build certificate with the --build option, then has their certificate signed by taking it with them to their next regional Ruby meetup (in our hypothetical example), and it’s signed there by the person holding the regional RubyGems signing certificate, which is signed at the next RubyConf by the holder of the top-level RubyGems certificate. At each point the issuer runs the same command:
# sign a certificate with the specified key and certificate # (note that this modifies client_cert.pem!) $ gem cert -K /mnt/floppy/issuer-priv_key.pem -C issuer-pub_cert.pem --sign client_cert.pem
Then the holder of issued certificate (in this case, your buddy “drbrain”), can start using this signed certificate to sign RubyGems. By the way, in order to let everyone else know about his new fancy signed certificate, “drbrain” would save his newly signed certificate as ~/.gem/gem-public_cert.pem
Obviously this RubyGems trust infrastructure doesn’t exist yet. Also, in the “real world”, issuers actually generate the child certificate from a certificate request, rather than sign an existing certificate. And our hypothetical infrastructure is missing a certificate revocation system. These are that can be fixed in the future…
At this point you should know how to do all of these new and interesting things:
build a gem signing key and certificate
adjust your security policy
modify your trusted certificate list
sign a certificate
In case you don’t trust RubyGems you can verify gem signatures manually:
Fetch and unpack the gem
gem fetch some_signed_gem tar -xf some_signed_gem-1.0.gem
Grab the public key from the gemspec
gem spec some_signed_gem-1.0.gem cert_chain | \ ruby -rpsych -e 'puts Psych.load($stdin)' > public_key.crt
Generate a SHA1 hash of the data.tar.gz
openssl dgst -sha1 < data.tar.gz > my.hash
Verify the signature
openssl rsautl -verify -inkey public_key.crt -certin \ -in data.tar.gz.sig > verified.hash
Compare your hash to the verified hash
diff -s verified.hash my.hash
Repeat 5 and 6 with metadata.gz
OpenSSL Reference The .pem files generated by –build and –sign are PEM files. Here’s a couple of useful OpenSSL commands for manipulating them:
# convert a PEM format X509 certificate into DER format: # (note: Windows .cer files are X509 certificates in DER format) $ openssl x509 -in input.pem -outform der -out output.der # print out the certificate in a human-readable format: $ openssl x509 -in input.pem -noout -text
And you can do the same thing with the private key file as well:
# convert a PEM format RSA key into DER format: $ openssl rsa -in input_key.pem -outform der -out output_key.der # print out the key in a human readable format: $ openssl rsa -in input_key.pem -noout -text
There’s no way to define a system-wide trust list.
custom security policies (from a YAML file, etc)
Simple method to generate a signed certificate request
Support for OCSP, SCVP, CRLs, or some other form of cert status check (list is in order of preference)
Support for encrypted private keys
Some sort of semi-formal trust hierarchy (see long-winded explanation above)
Path discovery (for gem certificate chains that don’t have a self-signed root) – by the way, since we don’t have this, THE ROOT OF THE CERTIFICATE CHAIN MUST BE SELF SIGNED if Policy#verify_root is true (and it is for the MediumSecurity and HighSecurity policies)
Better explanation of X509 naming (ie, we don’t have to use email addresses)
Honor AIA field (see note about OCSP above)
Honor extension restrictions
Might be better to store the certificate chain as a PKCS#7 or PKCS#12 file, instead of an array embedded in the metadata.
Paul Duncan <pabs@pablotron.org> pablotron.org/
Mixin methods for install and update options for Gem::Commands
Mixin methods for security option for Gem::Commands
Mixin methods for Gem::Command to promote available RubyGems update
Module that defines the default UserInteraction. Any class including this module will have access to the ui method that returns the default UI.
UserInteraction allows RubyGems to interact with the user through standard methods that can be replaced with more-specific UI methods for different displays.
Since UserInteraction dispatches to a concrete UI class you may need to reference other classes for specific behavior such as Gem::ConsoleUI or Gem::SilentUI.
Example:
class X include Gem::UserInteraction def get_answer n = ask("What is the meaning of life?") end end
A stub yaml serializer that can handle only hashes and strings (as of now).
The parent class for all constructed encodings. The value attribute of a Constructive is always an Array. Attributes are the same as for ASN1Data, with the addition of tagging.
Most constructed encodings come in the form of a SET or a SEQUENCE. These encodings are represented by one of the two sub-classes of Constructive:
OpenSSL::ASN1::Sequence
Please note that tagged sequences and sets are still parsed as instances of ASN1Data. Find further details on tagged values there.
int = OpenSSL::ASN1::Integer.new(1) str = OpenSSL::ASN1::PrintableString.new('abc') sequence = OpenSSL::ASN1::Sequence.new( [ int, str ] )
int = OpenSSL::ASN1::Integer.new(1) str = OpenSSL::ASN1::PrintableString.new('abc') set = OpenSSL::ASN1::Set.new( [ int, str ] )
Represents a YAML stream. This is the root node for any YAML parse tree. This node must have one or more child nodes. The only valid child node for a Psych::Nodes::Stream node is Psych::Nodes::Document.
This class provides a compatibility layer between prism and Ripper. It functions by parsing the entire tree first and then walking it and executing each of the Ripper callbacks as it goes. To use this class, you treat ‘Prism::Translation::Ripper` effectively as you would treat the `Ripper` class.
Note that this class will serve the most common use cases, but Ripper’s API is extensive and undocumented. It relies on reporting the state of the parser at any given time. We do our best to replicate that here, but because it is a different architecture it is not possible to perfectly replicate the behavior of Ripper.
The main known difference is that we may omit dispatching some events in some cases. This impacts the following events:
on_assign_error
on_comma
on_ignored_nl
on_ignored_sp
on_kw
on_label_end
on_lbrace
on_lbracket
on_lparen
on_nl
on_op
on_operator_ambiguous
on_rbrace
on_rbracket
on_rparen
on_semicolon
on_sp
on_symbeg
on_tstring_beg
on_tstring_end
The TrustDir manages the trusted certificates for gem signature verification.