Signing gems
The Gem::Security
implements cryptographic signatures for gems. The section below is a step-by-step guide to using signed gems and generating your own.
Walkthrough
Building your certificate
In order to start signing your gems, you’ll need to build a private key and a self-signed certificate. Here’s how:
# build a private key and certificate for yourself: $ gem cert --build you@example.com
This could take anywhere from a few seconds to a minute or two, depending on the speed of your computer (public key algorithms aren’t exactly the speediest crypto algorithms in the world). When it’s finished, you’ll see the files “gem-private_key.pem” and “gem-public_cert.pem” in the current directory.
First things first: Move both files to ~/.gem if you don’t already have a key and certificate in that directory. Ensure the file permissions make the key unreadable by others (by default the file is saved securely).
Keep your private key hidden; if it’s compromised, someone can sign packages as you (note: PKI has ways of mitigating the risk of stolen keys; more on that later).
Signing Gems
In RubyGems 2 and newer there is no extra work to sign a gem. RubyGems will automatically find your key and certificate in your home directory and use them to sign newly packaged gems.
If your certificate is not self-signed (signed by a third party) RubyGems will attempt to load the certificate chain from the trusted certificates. Use gem cert --add signing_cert.pem
to add your signers as trusted certificates. See below for further information on certificate chains.
If you build your gem it will automatically be signed. If you peek inside your gem file, you’ll see a couple of new files have been added:
$ tar tf your-gem-1.0.gem metadata.gz metadata.gz.sig # metadata signature data.tar.gz data.tar.gz.sig # data signature checksums.yaml.gz checksums.yaml.gz.sig # checksums signature
Manually signing gems
If you wish to store your key in a separate secure location you’ll need to set your gems up for signing by hand. To do this, set the signing_key
and cert_chain
in the gemspec before packaging your gem:
s.signing_key = '/secure/path/to/gem-private_key.pem' s.cert_chain = %w[/secure/path/to/gem-public_cert.pem]
When you package your gem with these options set RubyGems will automatically load your key and certificate from the secure paths.
Signed gems and security policies
Now let’s verify the signature. Go ahead and install the gem, but add the following options: -P HighSecurity
, like this:
# install the gem with using the security policy "HighSecurity" $ sudo gem install your.gem -P HighSecurity
The -P
option sets your security policy – we’ll talk about that in just a minute. Eh, what’s this?
$ gem install -P HighSecurity your-gem-1.0.gem ERROR: While executing gem ... (Gem::Security::Exception) root cert /CN=you/DC=example is not trusted
The culprit here is the security policy. RubyGems has several different security policies. Let’s take a short break and go over the security policies. Here’s a list of the available security policies, and a brief description of each one:
-
NoSecurity
- Well, no security at all. Signed packages are treated like unsigned packages. -
LowSecurity
- Pretty much no security. If a package is signed then RubyGems will make sure the signature matches the signing certificate, and that the signing certificate hasn’t expired, but that’s it. A malicious user could easily circumvent this kind of security. -
MediumSecurity
- Better thanLowSecurity
andNoSecurity
, but still fallible.Package
contents are verified against the signing certificate, and the signing certificate is checked for validity, and checked against the rest of the certificate chain (if you don’t know what a certificate chain is, stay tuned, we’ll get to that). The biggest improvement overLowSecurity
is thatMediumSecurity
won’t install packages that are signed by untrusted sources. Unfortunately,MediumSecurity
still isn’t totally secure – a malicious user can still unpack the gem, strip the signatures, and distribute the gem unsigned. -
HighSecurity
- Here’s the bugger that got us into this mess. TheHighSecurity
policy is identical to theMediumSecurity
policy, except that it does not allow unsigned gems. A malicious user doesn’t have a whole lot of options here; they can’t modify the package contents without invalidating the signature, and they can’t modify or remove signature or the signing certificate chain, or RubyGems will simply refuse to install the package. Oh well, maybe they’ll have better luck causing problems for CPAN users instead :).
The reason RubyGems refused to install your shiny new signed gem was because it was from an untrusted source. Well, your code is infallible (naturally), so you need to add yourself as a trusted source:
# add trusted certificate gem cert --add ~/.gem/gem-public_cert.pem
You’ve now added your public certificate as a trusted source. Now you can install packages signed by your private key without any hassle. Let’s try the install command above again:
# install the gem with using the HighSecurity policy (and this time # without any shenanigans) $ gem install -P HighSecurity your-gem-1.0.gem Successfully installed your-gem-1.0 1 gem installed
This time RubyGems will accept your signed package and begin installing.
While you’re waiting for RubyGems to work it’s magic, have a look at some of the other security commands by running gem help cert
:
Options: -a, --add CERT Add a trusted certificate. -l, --list [FILTER] List trusted certificates where the subject contains FILTER -r, --remove FILTER Remove trusted certificates where the subject contains FILTER -b, --build EMAIL_ADDR Build private key and self-signed certificate for EMAIL_ADDR -C, --certificate CERT Signing certificate for --sign -K, --private-key KEY Key for --sign or --build -A, --key-algorithm ALGORITHM Select key algorithm for --build from RSA, DSA, or EC. Defaults to RSA. -s, --sign CERT Signs CERT with the key from -K and the certificate from -C -d, --days NUMBER_OF_DAYS Days before the certificate expires -R, --re-sign Re-signs the certificate from -C with the key from -K
We’ve already covered the --build
option, and the --add
, --list
, and --remove
commands seem fairly straightforward; they allow you to add, list, and remove the certificates in your trusted certificate list. But what’s with this --sign
option?
Certificate chains
To answer that question, let’s take a look at “certificate chains”, a concept I mentioned earlier. There are a couple of problems with self-signed certificates: first of all, self-signed certificates don’t offer a whole lot of security. Sure, the certificate says Yukihiro Matsumoto, but how do I know it was actually generated and signed by matz himself unless he gave me the certificate in person?
The second problem is scalability. Sure, if there are 50 gem authors, then I have 50 trusted certificates, no problem. What if there are 500 gem authors? 1000? Having to constantly add new trusted certificates is a pain, and it actually makes the trust system less secure by encouraging RubyGems users to blindly trust new certificates.
Here’s where certificate chains come in. A certificate chain establishes an arbitrarily long chain of trust between an issuing certificate and a child certificate. So instead of trusting certificates on a per-developer basis, we use the PKI concept of certificate chains to build a logical hierarchy of trust. Here’s a hypothetical example of a trust hierarchy based (roughly) on geography:
-------------------------- | rubygems@rubygems.org | -------------------------- | ----------------------------------- | | ---------------------------- ----------------------------- | seattlerb@seattlerb.org | | dcrubyists@richkilmer.com | ---------------------------- ----------------------------- | | | | --------------- ---------------- ----------- -------------- | drbrain | | zenspider | | pabs@dc | | tomcope@dc | --------------- ---------------- ----------- --------------
Now, rather than having 4 trusted certificates (one for drbrain, zenspider, pabs@dc, and tomecope@dc), a user could actually get by with one certificate, the “rubygems@rubygems.org” certificate.
Here’s how it works:
I install “rdoc-3.12.gem”, a package signed by “drbrain”. I’ve never heard of “drbrain”, but his certificate has a valid signature from the “seattle.rb@seattlerb.org” certificate, which in turn has a valid signature from the “rubygems@rubygems.org” certificate. Voila! At this point, it’s much more reasonable for me to trust a package signed by “drbrain”, because I can establish a chain to “rubygems@rubygems.org”, which I do trust.
Signing certificates
The --sign
option allows all this to happen. A developer creates their build certificate with the --build
option, then has their certificate signed by taking it with them to their next regional Ruby meetup (in our hypothetical example), and it’s signed there by the person holding the regional RubyGems signing certificate, which is signed at the next RubyConf by the holder of the top-level RubyGems certificate. At each point the issuer runs the same command:
# sign a certificate with the specified key and certificate # (note that this modifies client_cert.pem!) $ gem cert -K /mnt/floppy/issuer-priv_key.pem -C issuer-pub_cert.pem --sign client_cert.pem
Then the holder of issued certificate (in this case, your buddy “drbrain”), can start using this signed certificate to sign RubyGems. By the way, in order to let everyone else know about his new fancy signed certificate, “drbrain” would save his newly signed certificate as ~/.gem/gem-public_cert.pem
Obviously this RubyGems trust infrastructure doesn’t exist yet. Also, in the “real world”, issuers actually generate the child certificate from a certificate request, rather than sign an existing certificate. And our hypothetical infrastructure is missing a certificate revocation system. These are that can be fixed in the future…
At this point you should know how to do all of these new and interesting things:
-
build a gem signing key and certificate
-
adjust your security policy
-
modify your trusted certificate list
-
sign a certificate
Manually verifying signatures
In case you don’t trust RubyGems you can verify gem signatures manually:
-
Fetch and unpack the gem
gem fetch some_signed_gem tar -xf some_signed_gem-1.0.gem
-
Grab the public key from the gemspec
gem spec some_signed_gem-1.0.gem cert_chain | \ ruby -rpsych -e 'puts Psych.load($stdin)' > public_key.crt
-
Generate a SHA1 hash of the data.tar.gz
openssl dgst -sha1 < data.tar.gz > my.hash
-
Verify the signature
openssl rsautl -verify -inkey public_key.crt -certin \ -in data.tar.gz.sig > verified.hash
-
Compare your hash to the verified hash
diff -s verified.hash my.hash
-
Repeat 5 and 6 with metadata.gz
OpenSSL
Reference
The .pem files generated by –build and –sign are PEM files. Here’s a couple of useful OpenSSL
commands for manipulating them:
# convert a PEM format X509 certificate into DER format: # (note: Windows .cer files are X509 certificates in DER format) $ openssl x509 -in input.pem -outform der -out output.der # print out the certificate in a human-readable format: $ openssl x509 -in input.pem -noout -text
And you can do the same thing with the private key file as well:
# convert a PEM format RSA key into DER format: $ openssl rsa -in input_key.pem -outform der -out output_key.der # print out the key in a human readable format: $ openssl rsa -in input_key.pem -noout -text
Bugs/TODO
-
There’s no way to define a system-wide trust list.
-
custom security policies (from a
YAML
file, etc) -
Simple method to generate a signed certificate request
-
Support for OCSP, SCVP, CRLs, or some other form of cert status check (list is in order of preference)
-
Support for encrypted private keys
-
Some sort of semi-formal trust hierarchy (see long-winded explanation above)
-
Path discovery (for gem certificate chains that don’t have a self-signed root) – by the way, since we don’t have this, THE ROOT OF THE CERTIFICATE CHAIN MUST BE SELF SIGNED if
Policy#verify_root
is true (and it is for theMediumSecurity
andHighSecurity
policies) -
Better explanation of X509 naming (ie, we don’t have to use email addresses)
-
Honor AIA field (see note about OCSP above)
-
Honor extension restrictions
-
Might be better to store the certificate chain as a PKCS#7 or PKCS#12 file, instead of an array embedded in the metadata.
Original author
Paul Duncan <pabs@pablotron.org> pablotron.org/
Used internally to select the signing digest from all computed digests
Length of keys created by RSA and DSA keys
Default algorithm to use when building a key pair
Named curve used for Elliptic Curve
Cipher used to encrypt the key pair used to sign gems. Must be in the list returned by OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers
One day in seconds
One year in seconds
The default set of extensions are:
-
The certificate is not a certificate authority
-
The key for the certificate may be used for key and data encipherment and digital signatures
-
The certificate contains a subject key identifier
No security policy: all package signature checks are disabled.
AlmostNo security policy: only verify that the signing certificate is the one that actually signed the data. Make no attempt to verify the signing certificate chain.
This policy is basically useless. better than nothing, but can still be easily spoofed, and is not recommended.
Low security policy: only verify that the signing certificate is actually the gem signer, and that the signing certificate is valid.
This policy is better than nothing, but can still be easily spoofed, and is not recommended.
Medium security policy: verify the signing certificate, verify the signing certificate chain all the way to the root certificate, and only trust root certificates that we have explicitly allowed trust for.
This security policy is reasonable, but it allows unsigned packages, so a malicious person could simply delete the package signature and pass the gem off as unsigned.
High security policy: only allow signed gems to be installed, verify the signing certificate, verify the signing certificate chain all the way to the root certificate, and only trust root certificates that we have explicitly allowed trust for.
This security policy is significantly more difficult to bypass, and offers a reasonable guarantee that the contents of the gem have not been altered.
Policy
used to verify a certificate and key when signing a gem
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 385
def self.alt_name_or_x509_entry(certificate, x509_entry)
alt_name = certificate.extensions.find do |extension|
extension.oid == "#{x509_entry}AltName"
end
return alt_name.value if alt_name
certificate.send x509_entry
end
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 401
def self.create_cert(subject, key, age = ONE_YEAR, extensions = EXTENSIONS,
serial = 1)
cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
cert.public_key = get_public_key(key)
cert.version = 2
cert.serial = serial
cert.not_before = Time.now
cert.not_after = Time.now + age
cert.subject = subject
ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new nil, cert
cert.extensions = extensions.map do |ext_name, value|
ef.create_extension ext_name, value
end
cert
end
Creates an unsigned certificate for subject
and key
. The lifetime of the key is from the current time to age
which defaults to one year.
The extensions
restrict the key to the indicated uses.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 441
def self.create_cert_email(email, key, age = ONE_YEAR, extensions = EXTENSIONS)
subject = email_to_name email
extensions = extensions.merge "subjectAltName" => "email:#{email}"
create_cert_self_signed subject, key, age, extensions
end
Creates a self-signed certificate with an issuer and subject from email
, a subject alternative name of email
and the given extensions
for the key
.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 453
def self.create_cert_self_signed(subject, key, age = ONE_YEAR,
extensions = EXTENSIONS, serial = 1)
certificate = create_cert subject, key, age, extensions
sign certificate, key, certificate, age, extensions, serial
end
Creates a self-signed certificate with an issuer and subject of subject
and the given extensions
for the key
.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 465
def self.create_digest(algorithm = DIGEST_NAME)
OpenSSL::Digest.new(algorithm)
end
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 480
def self.create_key(algorithm)
if defined?(OpenSSL::PKey)
case algorithm.downcase
when "dsa"
OpenSSL::PKey::DSA.new(RSA_DSA_KEY_LENGTH)
when "rsa"
OpenSSL::PKey::RSA.new(RSA_DSA_KEY_LENGTH)
when "ec"
OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate(EC_NAME)
else
raise Gem::Security::Exception,
"#{algorithm} algorithm not found. RSA, DSA, and EC algorithms are supported."
end
end
end
Creates a new key pair of the specified algorithm
. RSA, DSA, and EC are supported.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 499
def self.email_to_name(email_address)
email_address = email_address.gsub(/[^\w@.-]+/i, "_")
cn, dcs = email_address.split "@"
dcs = dcs.split "."
OpenSSL::X509::Name.new([
["CN", cn],
*dcs.map {|dc| ["DC", dc] },
])
end
Turns email_address
into an OpenSSL::X509::Name
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 426
def self.get_public_key(key)
# Ruby 3.0 (Ruby/OpenSSL 2.2) or later
return OpenSSL::PKey.read(key.public_to_der) if key.respond_to?(:public_to_der)
return key.public_key unless key.is_a?(OpenSSL::PKey::EC)
ec_key = OpenSSL::PKey::EC.new(key.group.curve_name)
ec_key.public_key = key.public_key
ec_key
end
Gets the right public key from a PKey instance
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 518
def self.re_sign(expired_certificate, private_key, age = ONE_YEAR,
extensions = EXTENSIONS)
raise Gem::Security::Exception,
"incorrect signing key for re-signing " +
"#{expired_certificate.subject}" unless
expired_certificate.check_private_key(private_key)
unless expired_certificate.subject.to_s ==
expired_certificate.issuer.to_s
subject = alt_name_or_x509_entry expired_certificate, :subject
issuer = alt_name_or_x509_entry expired_certificate, :issuer
raise Gem::Security::Exception,
"#{subject} is not self-signed, contact #{issuer} " +
"to obtain a valid certificate"
end
serial = expired_certificate.serial + 1
create_cert_self_signed(expired_certificate.subject, private_key, age,
extensions, serial)
end
Signs expired_certificate
with private_key
if the keys match and the expired certificate was self-signed.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 544
def self.reset
@trust_dir = nil
end
Resets the trust directory for verifying gems.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 555
def self.sign(certificate, signing_key, signing_cert,
age = ONE_YEAR, extensions = EXTENSIONS, serial = 1)
signee_subject = certificate.subject
signee_key = certificate.public_key
alt_name = certificate.extensions.find do |extension|
extension.oid == "subjectAltName"
end
extensions = extensions.merge "subjectAltName" => alt_name.value if
alt_name
issuer_alt_name = signing_cert.extensions.find do |extension|
extension.oid == "subjectAltName"
end
extensions = extensions.merge "issuerAltName" => issuer_alt_name.value if
issuer_alt_name
signed = create_cert signee_subject, signee_key, age, extensions, serial
signed.issuer = signing_cert.subject
signed.sign signing_key, Gem::Security::DIGEST_NAME
end
Sign the public key from certificate
with the signing_key
and signing_cert
, using the Gem::Security::DIGEST_NAME. Uses the default certificate validity range and extensions.
Returns the newly signed certificate.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 584
def self.trust_dir
return @trust_dir if @trust_dir
dir = File.join Gem.user_home, ".gem", "trust"
@trust_dir ||= Gem::Security::TrustDir.new dir
end
Returns a Gem::Security::TrustDir
which wraps the directory where trusted certificates live.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 595
def self.trusted_certificates(&block)
trust_dir.each_certificate(&block)
end
Enumerates the trusted certificates via Gem::Security::TrustDir
.
# File tmp/rubies/ruby-3.2.0/lib/rubygems/security.rb, line 604
def self.write(pemmable, path, permissions = 0600, passphrase = nil, cipher = KEY_CIPHER)
path = File.expand_path path
File.open path, "wb", permissions do |io|
if passphrase && cipher
io.write pemmable.to_pem cipher, passphrase
else
io.write pemmable.to_pem
end
end
path
end
Writes pemmable
, which must respond to to_pem
to path
with the given permissions
. If passed cipher
and passphrase
those arguments will be passed to to_pem
.