Raised when an attempt is made to send a message to a closed port, or to retrieve a message from a closed and empty port. Ports may be closed explicitly with Ractor#close_outgoing/close_incoming and are closed implicitly when a Ractor terminates.
r = Ractor.new { sleep(500) } r.close_outgoing r.take # Ractor::ClosedError
ClosedError is a descendant of StopIteration, so the closing of the ractor will break the loops without propagating the error:
r = Ractor.new do loop do msg = receive # raises ClosedError and loop traps it puts "Received: #{msg}" end puts "loop exited" end 3.times{|i| r << i} r.close_incoming r.take puts "Continue successfully"
This will print:
Received: 0 Received: 1 Received: 2 loop exited Continue successfully
Encoding conversion class.
Utility methods for using the RubyGems API.
Helper methods for both Gem::Installer and Gem::Uninstaller
Module that defines the default UserInteraction. Any class including this module will have access to the ui method that returns the default UI.
UserInteraction allows RubyGems to interact with the user through standard methods that can be replaced with more-specific UI methods for different displays.
Since UserInteraction dispatches to a concrete UI class you may need to reference other classes for specific behavior such as Gem::ConsoleUI or Gem::SilentUI.
Example:
class X include Gem::UserInteraction def get_answer n = ask("What is the meaning of life?") end end
A progress reporter that prints out messages about the current progress.
Raised by Encoding and String methods when the source encoding is incompatible with the target encoding.
An FFI closure wrapper, for handling callbacks.
closure = Class.new(Fiddle::Closure) { def call 10 end }.new(Fiddle::TYPE_INT, []) #=> #<#<Class:0x0000000150d308>:0x0000000150d240> func = Fiddle::Function.new(closure, [], Fiddle::TYPE_INT) #=> #<Fiddle::Function:0x00000001516e58> func.call #=> 10
Generic error class for Fiddle
standard dynamic load exception
Used internally by Fiddle::Importer
Fiddle::Pointer is a class to handle C pointers
The base exception for JSON errors.
Provides symmetric algorithms for encryption and decryption. The algorithms that are available depend on the particular version of OpenSSL that is installed.
A list of supported algorithms can be obtained by
puts OpenSSL::Cipher.ciphers
Cipher There are several ways to create a Cipher instance. Generally, a Cipher algorithm is categorized by its name, the key length in bits and the cipher mode to be used. The most generic way to create a Cipher is the following
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('<name>-<key length>-<mode>')
That is, a string consisting of the hyphenated concatenation of the individual components name, key length and mode. Either all uppercase or all lowercase strings may be used, for example:
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc')
Encryption and decryption are often very similar operations for symmetric algorithms, this is reflected by not having to choose different classes for either operation, both can be done using the same class. Still, after obtaining a Cipher instance, we need to tell the instance what it is that we intend to do with it, so we need to call either
cipher.encrypt
or
cipher.decrypt
on the Cipher instance. This should be the first call after creating the instance, otherwise configuration that has already been set could get lost in the process.
Symmetric encryption requires a key that is the same for the encrypting and for the decrypting party and after initial key establishment should be kept as private information. There are a lot of ways to create insecure keys, the most notable is to simply take a password as the key without processing the password further. A simple and secure way to create a key for a particular Cipher is
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-256-cfb') cipher.encrypt key = cipher.random_key # also sets the generated key on the Cipher
If you absolutely need to use passwords as encryption keys, you should use Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) by generating the key with the help of the functionality provided by OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac_sha1 or OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac.
Although there is Cipher#pkcs5_keyivgen, its use is deprecated and it should only be used in legacy applications because it does not use the newer PKCS#5 v2 algorithms.
The cipher modes CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR all need an “initialization vector”, or short, IV. ECB mode is the only mode that does not require an IV, but there is almost no legitimate use case for this mode because of the fact that it does not sufficiently hide plaintext patterns. Therefore
You should never use ECB mode unless you are absolutely sure that you absolutely need it
Because of this, you will end up with a mode that explicitly requires an IV in any case. Although the IV can be seen as public information, i.e. it may be transmitted in public once generated, it should still stay unpredictable to prevent certain kinds of attacks. Therefore, ideally
Always create a secure random IV for every encryption of your Cipher
A new, random IV should be created for every encryption of data. Think of the IV as a nonce (number used once) - it’s public but random and unpredictable. A secure random IV can be created as follows
cipher = ... cipher.encrypt key = cipher.random_key iv = cipher.random_iv # also sets the generated IV on the Cipher
Although the key is generally a random value, too, it is a bad choice as an IV. There are elaborate ways how an attacker can take advantage of such an IV. As a general rule of thumb, exposing the key directly or indirectly should be avoided at all cost and exceptions only be made with good reason.
Cipher#final ECB (which should not be used) and CBC are both block-based modes. This means that unlike for the other streaming-based modes, they operate on fixed-size blocks of data, and therefore they require a “finalization” step to produce or correctly decrypt the last block of data by appropriately handling some form of padding. Therefore it is essential to add the output of OpenSSL::Cipher#final to your encryption/decryption buffer or you will end up with decryption errors or truncated data.
Although this is not really necessary for streaming-mode ciphers, it is still recommended to apply the same pattern of adding the output of Cipher#final there as well - it also enables you to switch between modes more easily in the future.
data = "Very, very confidential data" cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc') cipher.encrypt key = cipher.random_key iv = cipher.random_iv encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final ... decipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-cbc') decipher.decrypt decipher.key = key decipher.iv = iv plain = decipher.update(encrypted) + decipher.final puts data == plain #=> true
If the OpenSSL version used supports it, an Authenticated Encryption mode (such as GCM or CCM) should always be preferred over any unauthenticated mode. Currently, OpenSSL supports AE only in combination with Associated Data (AEAD) where additional associated data is included in the encryption process to compute a tag at the end of the encryption. This tag will also be used in the decryption process and by verifying its validity, the authenticity of a given ciphertext is established.
This is superior to unauthenticated modes in that it allows to detect if somebody effectively changed the ciphertext after it had been encrypted. This prevents malicious modifications of the ciphertext that could otherwise be exploited to modify ciphertexts in ways beneficial to potential attackers.
An associated data is used where there is additional information, such as headers or some metadata, that must be also authenticated but not necessarily need to be encrypted. If no associated data is needed for encryption and later decryption, the OpenSSL library still requires a value to be set - “” may be used in case none is available.
An example using the GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). You have 16 bytes key, 12 bytes (96 bits) nonce and the associated data auth_data. Be sure not to reuse the key and nonce pair. Reusing an nonce ruins the security guarantees of GCM mode.
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-gcm').encrypt cipher.key = key cipher.iv = nonce cipher.auth_data = auth_data encrypted = cipher.update(data) + cipher.final tag = cipher.auth_tag # produces 16 bytes tag by default
Now you are the receiver. You know the key and have received nonce, auth_data, encrypted and tag through an untrusted network. Note that GCM accepts an arbitrary length tag between 1 and 16 bytes. You may additionally need to check that the received tag has the correct length, or you allow attackers to forge a valid single byte tag for the tampered ciphertext with a probability of 1/256.
raise "tag is truncated!" unless tag.bytesize == 16 decipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new('aes-128-gcm').decrypt decipher.key = key decipher.iv = nonce decipher.auth_tag = tag decipher.auth_data = auth_data decrypted = decipher.update(encrypted) + decipher.final puts data == decrypted #=> true
OpenSSL::Digest allows you to compute message digests (sometimes interchangeably called “hashes”) of arbitrary data that are cryptographically secure, i.e. a Digest implements a secure one-way function.
One-way functions offer some useful properties. E.g. given two distinct inputs the probability that both yield the same output is highly unlikely. Combined with the fact that every message digest algorithm has a fixed-length output of just a few bytes, digests are often used to create unique identifiers for arbitrary data. A common example is the creation of a unique id for binary documents that are stored in a database.
Another useful characteristic of one-way functions (and thus the name) is that given a digest there is no indication about the original data that produced it, i.e. the only way to identify the original input is to “brute-force” through every possible combination of inputs.
These characteristics make one-way functions also ideal companions for public key signature algorithms: instead of signing an entire document, first a hash of the document is produced with a considerably faster message digest algorithm and only the few bytes of its output need to be signed using the slower public key algorithm. To validate the integrity of a signed document, it suffices to re-compute the hash and verify that it is equal to that in the signature.
You can get a list of all digest algorithms supported on your system by running this command in your terminal:
openssl list -digest-algorithms
Among the OpenSSL 1.1.1 supported message digest algorithms are:
SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA512-224 and SHA512-256
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384 and SHA3-512
BLAKE2s256 and BLAKE2b512
Each of these algorithms can be instantiated using the name:
digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA256')
“Breaking” a message digest algorithm means defying its one-way function characteristics, i.e. producing a collision or finding a way to get to the original data by means that are more efficient than brute-forcing etc. Most of the supported digest algorithms can be considered broken in this sense, even the very popular MD5 and SHA1 algorithms. Should security be your highest concern, then you should probably rely on SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512.
data = File.binread('document') sha256 = OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA256') digest = sha256.digest(data)
data1 = File.binread('file1') data2 = File.binread('file2') data3 = File.binread('file3') sha256 = OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA256') sha256 << data1 sha256 << data2 sha256 << data3 digest = sha256.digest
Digest instance data1 = File.binread('file1') sha256 = OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA256') digest1 = sha256.digest(data1) data2 = File.binread('file2') sha256.reset digest2 = sha256.digest(data2)
Generic error, common for all classes under OpenSSL module
Generic Error for all of OpenSSL::BN (big num)