Results for: "to_proc"

Raised by Encoding and String methods when a transcoding operation fails.

Raised by Encoding and String methods when the string being transcoded contains a byte invalid for the either the source or target encoding.

Raised by transcoding methods when a named encoding does not correspond with a known converter.

OpenSSL::OCSP implements Online Certificate Status Protocol requests and responses.

Creating and sending an OCSP request requires a subject certificate that contains an OCSP URL in an authorityInfoAccess extension and the issuer certificate for the subject certificate. First, load the issuer and subject certificates:

subject = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new subject_pem
issuer  = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new issuer_pem

To create the request we need to create a certificate ID for the subject certificate so the CA knows which certificate we are asking about:

digest = OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA1')
certificate_id =
  OpenSSL::OCSP::CertificateId.new subject, issuer, digest

Then create a request and add the certificate ID to it:

request = OpenSSL::OCSP::Request.new
request.add_certid certificate_id

Adding a nonce to the request protects against replay attacks but not all CA process the nonce.

request.add_nonce

To submit the request to the CA for verification we need to extract the OCSP URI from the subject certificate:

ocsp_uris = subject.ocsp_uris

require 'uri'

ocsp_uri = URI ocsp_uris[0]

To submit the request we’ll POST the request to the OCSP URI (per RFC 2560). Note that we only handle HTTP requests and don’t handle any redirects in this example, so this is insufficient for serious use.

require 'net/http'

http_response =
  Net::HTTP.start ocsp_uri.hostname, ocsp_uri.port do |http|
    http.post ocsp_uri.path, request.to_der,
              'content-type' => 'application/ocsp-request'
end

response = OpenSSL::OCSP::Response.new http_response.body
response_basic = response.basic

First we check if the response has a valid signature. Without a valid signature we cannot trust it. If you get a failure here you may be missing a system certificate store or may be missing the intermediate certificates.

store = OpenSSL::X509::Store.new
store.set_default_paths

unless response_basic.verify [], store then
  raise 'response is not signed by a trusted certificate'
end

The response contains the status information (success/fail). We can display the status as a string:

puts response.status_string #=> successful

Next we need to know the response details to determine if the response matches our request. First we check the nonce. Again, not all CAs support a nonce. See Request#check_nonce for the meanings of the return values.

p request.check_nonce basic_response #=> value from -1 to 3

Then extract the status information for the certificate from the basic response.

single_response = basic_response.find_response(certificate_id)

unless single_response
  raise 'basic_response does not have the status for the certificate'
end

Then check the validity. A status issued in the future must be rejected.

unless single_response.check_validity
  raise 'this_update is in the future or next_update time has passed'
end

case single_response.cert_status
when OpenSSL::OCSP::V_CERTSTATUS_GOOD
  puts 'certificate is still valid'
when OpenSSL::OCSP::V_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED
  puts "certificate has been revoked at #{single_response.revocation_time}"
when OpenSSL::OCSP::V_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN
  puts 'responder doesn't know about the certificate'
end

Flags for regular expression and match last line nodes.

Prism parses deterministically for the same input. This provides a nice property that is exposed through the node_id API on nodes. Effectively this means that for the same input, these values will remain consistent every time the source is parsed. This means we can reparse the source same with a node_id value and find the exact same node again.

The Relocation module provides an API around this property. It allows you to “save” nodes and locations using a minimal amount of memory (just the node_id and a field identifier) and then reify them later.

Mixin methods for local and remote Gem::Command options.

A StoreContext is used while validating a single certificate and holds the status involved.

Immutable and read-only representation of a timestamp token info from a Response.

Used to generate a Response from scratch.

Please bear in mind that the implementation will always apply and prefer the policy object identifier given in the request over the default policy id specified in the Factory. As a consequence, default_policy_id will only be applied if no Request#policy_id was given. But this also means that one needs to check the policy identifier in the request manually before creating the Response, e.g. to check whether it complies to a specific set of acceptable policies.

There exists also the possibility to add certificates (instances of OpenSSL::X509::Certificate) besides the timestamping certificate that will be included in the resulting timestamp token if Request#cert_requested? is true. Ideally, one would also include any intermediate certificates (the root certificate can be left out - in order to trust it any verifying party will have to be in its possession anyway). This simplifies validation of the timestamp since these intermediate certificates are “already there” and need not be passed as external parameters to Response#verify anymore, thus minimizing external resources needed for verification.

Example: Inclusion of (untrusted) intermediate certificates

Assume we received a timestamp request that has set Request#policy_id to nil and Request#cert_requested? to true. The raw request bytes are stored in a variable called req_raw. We’d still like to integrate the necessary intermediate certificates (in inter1.cer and inter2.cer) to simplify validation of the resulting Response. ts.p12 is a PKCS#12-compatible file including the private key and the timestamping certificate.

req = OpenSSL::Timestamp::Request.new(raw_bytes)
p12 = OpenSSL::PKCS12.new(File.binread('ts.p12'), 'pwd')
inter1 = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new(File.binread('inter1.cer'))
inter2 = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new(File.binread('inter2.cer'))
fac = OpenSSL::Timestamp::Factory.new
fac.gen_time = Time.now
fac.serial_number = 1
fac.allowed_digests = ["sha256", "sha384", "sha512"]
#needed because the Request contained no policy identifier
fac.default_policy_id = '1.2.3.4.5'
fac.additional_certificates = [ inter1, inter2 ]
timestamp = fac.create_timestamp(p12.key, p12.certificate, req)

Attributes

default_policy_id

Request#policy_id will always be preferred over this if present in the Request, only if Request#policy_id is nil default_policy will be used. If none of both is present, a TimestampError will be raised when trying to create a Response.

call-seq:

factory.default_policy_id = "string" -> string
factory.default_policy_id            -> string or nil

serial_number

Sets or retrieves the serial number to be used for timestamp creation. Must be present for timestamp creation.

call-seq:

factory.serial_number = number -> number
factory.serial_number          -> number or nil

gen_time

Sets or retrieves the Time value to be used in the Response. Must be present for timestamp creation.

call-seq:

factory.gen_time = Time -> Time
factory.gen_time        -> Time or nil

additional_certs

Sets or retrieves additional certificates apart from the timestamp certificate (e.g. intermediate certificates) to be added to the Response. Must be an Array of OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.

call-seq:

factory.additional_certs = [cert1, cert2] -> [ cert1, cert2 ]
factory.additional_certs                  -> array or nil

allowed_digests

Sets or retrieves the digest algorithms that the factory is allowed create timestamps for. Known vulnerable or weak algorithms should not be allowed where possible. Must be an Array of String or OpenSSL::Digest subclass instances.

call-seq:

factory.allowed_digests = ["sha1", OpenSSL::Digest.new('SHA256').new] -> [ "sha1", OpenSSL::Digest) ]
factory.allowed_digests                                               -> array or nil

The X509 certificate store holds trusted CA certificates used to verify peer certificates.

The easiest way to create a useful certificate store is:

cert_store = OpenSSL::X509::Store.new
cert_store.set_default_paths

This will use your system’s built-in certificates.

If your system does not have a default set of certificates you can obtain a set extracted from Mozilla CA certificate store by cURL maintainers here: curl.haxx.se/docs/caextract.html (You may wish to use the firefox-db2pem.sh script to extract the certificates from a local install to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.)

After downloading or generating a cacert.pem from the above link you can create a certificate store from the pem file like this:

cert_store = OpenSSL::X509::Store.new
cert_store.add_file 'cacert.pem'

The certificate store can be used with an SSLSocket like this:

ssl_context = OpenSSL::SSL::SSLContext.new
ssl_context.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER
ssl_context.cert_store = cert_store

tcp_socket = TCPSocket.open 'example.com', 443

ssl_socket = OpenSSL::SSL::SSLSocket.new tcp_socket, ssl_context

This class walks a YAML AST, converting each node to Ruby

File-based session storage class.

Implements session storage as a flat file of ‘key=value’ values. This storage type only works directly with String values; the user is responsible for converting other types to Strings when storing and from Strings when retrieving.

In-memory session storage class.

Implements session storage as a global in-memory hash. Session data will only persist for as long as the Ruby interpreter instance does.

Dummy session storage class.

Implements session storage place holder. No actual storage will be done.