Returns the RFC822 e-mail text equivalent of the URL, as a String.
Example:
require 'uri' uri = URI.parse("mailto:ruby-list@ruby-lang.org?Subject=subscribe&cc=myaddr") uri.to_mailtext # => "To: ruby-list@ruby-lang.org\nSubject: subscribe\nCc: myaddr\n\n\n"
URI::Parser.new([opts])
The constructor accepts a hash as options for parser. Keys of options are pattern names of URI components and values of options are pattern strings. The constructor generates set of regexps for parsing URIs.
You can use the following keys:
* :ESCAPED (URI::PATTERN::ESCAPED in default) * :UNRESERVED (URI::PATTERN::UNRESERVED in default) * :DOMLABEL (URI::PATTERN::DOMLABEL in default) * :TOPLABEL (URI::PATTERN::TOPLABEL in default) * :HOSTNAME (URI::PATTERN::HOSTNAME in default)
p = URI::Parser.new(:ESCAPED => "(?:%[a-fA-F0-9]{2}|%u[a-fA-F0-9]{4})") u = p.parse("http://example.jp/%uABCD") #=> #<URI::HTTP http://example.jp/%uABCD> URI.parse(u.to_s) #=> raises URI::InvalidURIError s = "http://example.com/ABCD" u1 = p.parse(s) #=> #<URI::HTTP http://example.com/ABCD> u2 = URI.parse(s) #=> #<URI::HTTP http://example.com/ABCD> u1 == u2 #=> true u1.eql?(u2) #=> false
Returns a split URI against regexp.
uri
Parses uri and constructs either matching URI scheme object (File, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, LDAP, LDAPS, or MailTo) or URI::Generic.
p = URI::Parser.new p.parse("ldap://ldap.example.com/dc=example?user=john") #=> #<URI::LDAP ldap://ldap.example.com/dc=example?user=john>
str
String to search
schemes
Patterns to apply to str
Attempts to parse and merge a set of URIs. If no block given, then returns the result, else it calls block for each element in result.
See also URI::Parser.make_regexp.
Constructs a safe String from str, removing unsafe characters, replacing them with codes.
Removes escapes from str.
Returns Regexp that is default self.regexp, unless schemes is provided. Then it is a Regexp.union with self.pattern.
Constructs the default Hash of patterns.
Constructs the default Hash of Regexp’s.
Raised when attempting a potential unsafe operation, typically when the $SAFE level is raised above 0.
foo = "bar" proc = Proc.new do $SAFE = 3 foo.untaint end proc.call
raises the exception:
SecurityError: Insecure: Insecure operation `untaint' at level 3
OpenURI is an easy-to-use wrapper for Net::HTTP, Net::HTTPS and Net::FTP.
It is possible to open an http, https or ftp URL as though it were a file:
open("http://www.ruby-lang.org/") {|f| f.each_line {|line| p line} }
The opened file has several getter methods for its meta-information, as follows, since it is extended by OpenURI::Meta.
open("http://www.ruby-lang.org/en") {|f| f.each_line {|line| p line} p f.base_uri # <URI::HTTP:0x40e6ef2 URL:http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/> p f.content_type # "text/html" p f.charset # "iso-8859-1" p f.content_encoding # [] p f.last_modified # Thu Dec 05 02:45:02 UTC 2002 }
Additional header fields can be specified by an optional hash argument.
open("http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/", "User-Agent" => "Ruby/#{RUBY_VERSION}", "From" => "foo@bar.invalid", "Referer" => "http://www.ruby-lang.org/") {|f| # ... }
The environment variables such as http_proxy, https_proxy and ftp_proxy are in effect by default. Here we disable proxy:
open("http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/", :proxy => nil) {|f| # ... }
See OpenURI::OpenRead.open and Kernel#open for more on available options.
URI objects can be opened in a similar way.
uri = URI.parse("http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/") uri.open {|f| # ... }
URI objects can be read directly. The returned string is also extended by OpenURI::Meta.
str = uri.read p str.base_uri
Tanaka Akira <akr@m17n.org>
Redirects to a path ending in /
Encodes given str to URL-encoded form data.
This method doesn’t convert *, -, ., 0-9, A-Z, _, a-z, but does convert SP (ASCII space) to + and converts others to %XX.
If enc is given, convert str to the encoding before percent encoding.
This is an implementation of www.w3.org/TR/2013/CR-html5-20130806/forms.html#url-encoded-form-data.
Decodes given str of URL-encoded form data.
This decodes + to SP.
Error raised by the DRbProtocol module when it cannot find any protocol implementation support the scheme specified in a URI.
The Gem::Security implements cryptographic signatures for gems. The section below is a step-by-step guide to using signed gems and generating your own.
In order to start signing your gems, you’ll need to build a private key and a self-signed certificate. Here’s how:
# build a private key and certificate for yourself: $ gem cert --build you@example.com
This could take anywhere from a few seconds to a minute or two, depending on the speed of your computer (public key algorithms aren’t exactly the speediest crypto algorithms in the world). When it’s finished, you’ll see the files “gem-private_key.pem” and “gem-public_cert.pem” in the current directory.
First things first: Move both files to ~/.gem if you don’t already have a key and certificate in that directory. Ensure the file permissions make the key unreadable by others (by default the file is saved securely).
Keep your private key hidden; if it’s compromised, someone can sign packages as you (note: PKI has ways of mitigating the risk of stolen keys; more on that later).
In RubyGems 2 and newer there is no extra work to sign a gem. RubyGems will automatically find your key and certificate in your home directory and use them to sign newly packaged gems.
If your certificate is not self-signed (signed by a third party) RubyGems will attempt to load the certificate chain from the trusted certificates. Use gem cert --add signing_cert.pem to add your signers as trusted certificates. See below for further information on certificate chains.
If you build your gem it will automatically be signed. If you peek inside your gem file, you’ll see a couple of new files have been added:
$ tar tf your-gem-1.0.gem metadata.gz metadata.gz.sum metadata.gz.sig # metadata signature data.tar.gz data.tar.gz.sum data.tar.gz.sig # data signature
If you wish to store your key in a separate secure location you’ll need to set your gems up for signing by hand. To do this, set the signing_key and cert_chain in the gemspec before packaging your gem:
s.signing_key = '/secure/path/to/gem-private_key.pem' s.cert_chain = %w[/secure/path/to/gem-public_cert.pem]
When you package your gem with these options set RubyGems will automatically load your key and certificate from the secure paths.
Now let’s verify the signature. Go ahead and install the gem, but add the following options: -P HighSecurity, like this:
# install the gem with using the security policy "HighSecurity" $ sudo gem install your.gem -P HighSecurity
The -P option sets your security policy – we’ll talk about that in just a minute. Eh, what’s this?
$ gem install -P HighSecurity your-gem-1.0.gem
ERROR: While executing gem ... (Gem::Security::Exception)
root cert /CN=you/DC=example is not trusted
The culprit here is the security policy. RubyGems has several different security policies. Let’s take a short break and go over the security policies. Here’s a list of the available security policies, and a brief description of each one:
NoSecurity - Well, no security at all. Signed packages are treated like unsigned packages.
LowSecurity - Pretty much no security. If a package is signed then RubyGems will make sure the signature matches the signing certificate, and that the signing certificate hasn’t expired, but that’s it. A malicious user could easily circumvent this kind of security.
MediumSecurity - Better than LowSecurity and NoSecurity, but still fallible. Package contents are verified against the signing certificate, and the signing certificate is checked for validity, and checked against the rest of the certificate chain (if you don’t know what a certificate chain is, stay tuned, we’ll get to that). The biggest improvement over LowSecurity is that MediumSecurity won’t install packages that are signed by untrusted sources. Unfortunately, MediumSecurity still isn’t totally secure – a malicious user can still unpack the gem, strip the signatures, and distribute the gem unsigned.
HighSecurity - Here’s the bugger that got us into this mess. The HighSecurity policy is identical to the MediumSecurity policy, except that it does not allow unsigned gems. A malicious user doesn’t have a whole lot of options here; they can’t modify the package contents without invalidating the signature, and they can’t modify or remove signature or the signing certificate chain, or RubyGems will simply refuse to install the package. Oh well, maybe they’ll have better luck causing problems for CPAN users instead :).
The reason RubyGems refused to install your shiny new signed gem was because it was from an untrusted source. Well, your code is infallible (naturally), so you need to add yourself as a trusted source:
# add trusted certificate gem cert --add ~/.gem/gem-public_cert.pem
You’ve now added your public certificate as a trusted source. Now you can install packages signed by your private key without any hassle. Let’s try the install command above again:
# install the gem with using the HighSecurity policy (and this time # without any shenanigans) $ gem install -P HighSecurity your-gem-1.0.gem Successfully installed your-gem-1.0 1 gem installed
This time RubyGems will accept your signed package and begin installing.
While you’re waiting for RubyGems to work it’s magic, have a look at some of the other security commands by running gem help cert:
Options:
-a, --add CERT Add a trusted certificate.
-l, --list [FILTER] List trusted certificates where the
subject contains FILTER
-r, --remove FILTER Remove trusted certificates where the
subject contains FILTER
-b, --build EMAIL_ADDR Build private key and self-signed
certificate for EMAIL_ADDR
-C, --certificate CERT Signing certificate for --sign
-K, --private-key KEY Key for --sign or --build
-s, --sign CERT Signs CERT with the key from -K
and the certificate from -C
We’ve already covered the --build option, and the --add, --list, and --remove commands seem fairly straightforward; they allow you to add, list, and remove the certificates in your trusted certificate list. But what’s with this --sign option?
To answer that question, let’s take a look at “certificate chains”, a concept I mentioned earlier. There are a couple of problems with self-signed certificates: first of all, self-signed certificates don’t offer a whole lot of security. Sure, the certificate says Yukihiro Matsumoto, but how do I know it was actually generated and signed by matz himself unless he gave me the certificate in person?
The second problem is scalability. Sure, if there are 50 gem authors, then I have 50 trusted certificates, no problem. What if there are 500 gem authors? 1000? Having to constantly add new trusted certificates is a pain, and it actually makes the trust system less secure by encouraging RubyGems users to blindly trust new certificates.
Here’s where certificate chains come in. A certificate chain establishes an arbitrarily long chain of trust between an issuing certificate and a child certificate. So instead of trusting certificates on a per-developer basis, we use the PKI concept of certificate chains to build a logical hierarchy of trust. Here’s a hypothetical example of a trust hierarchy based (roughly) on geography:
--------------------------
| rubygems@rubygems.org |
--------------------------
|
-----------------------------------
| |
---------------------------- -----------------------------
| seattlerb@seattlerb.org | | dcrubyists@richkilmer.com |
---------------------------- -----------------------------
| | | |
--------------- ---------------- ----------- --------------
| drbrain | | zenspider | | pabs@dc | | tomcope@dc |
--------------- ---------------- ----------- --------------
Now, rather than having 4 trusted certificates (one for drbrain, zenspider, pabs@dc, and tomecope@dc), a user could actually get by with one certificate, the “rubygems@rubygems.org” certificate.
Here’s how it works:
I install “rdoc-3.12.gem”, a package signed by “drbrain”. I’ve never heard of “drbrain”, but his certificate has a valid signature from the “seattle.rb@seattlerb.org” certificate, which in turn has a valid signature from the “rubygems@rubygems.org” certificate. Voila! At this point, it’s much more reasonable for me to trust a package signed by “drbrain”, because I can establish a chain to “rubygems@rubygems.org”, which I do trust.
The --sign option allows all this to happen. A developer creates their build certificate with the --build option, then has their certificate signed by taking it with them to their next regional Ruby meetup (in our hypothetical example), and it’s signed there by the person holding the regional RubyGems signing certificate, which is signed at the next RubyConf by the holder of the top-level RubyGems certificate. At each point the issuer runs the same command:
# sign a certificate with the specified key and certificate # (note that this modifies client_cert.pem!) $ gem cert -K /mnt/floppy/issuer-priv_key.pem -C issuer-pub_cert.pem --sign client_cert.pem
Then the holder of issued certificate (in this case, your buddy “drbrain”), can start using this signed certificate to sign RubyGems. By the way, in order to let everyone else know about his new fancy signed certificate, “drbrain” would save his newly signed certificate as ~/.gem/gem-public_cert.pem
Obviously this RubyGems trust infrastructure doesn’t exist yet. Also, in the “real world”, issuers actually generate the child certificate from a certificate request, rather than sign an existing certificate. And our hypothetical infrastructure is missing a certificate revocation system. These are that can be fixed in the future…
At this point you should know how to do all of these new and interesting things:
build a gem signing key and certificate
adjust your security policy
modify your trusted certificate list
sign a certificate
In case you don’t trust RubyGems you can verify gem signatures manually:
Fetch and unpack the gem
gem fetch some_signed_gem tar -xf some_signed_gem-1.0.gem
Grab the public key from the gemspec
gem spec some_signed_gem-1.0.gem cert_chain | \ ruby -ryaml -e 'puts YAML.load_documents($stdin)' > public_key.crt
Generate a SHA1 hash of the data.tar.gz
openssl dgst -sha1 < data.tar.gz > my.hash
Verify the signature
openssl rsautl -verify -inkey public_key.crt -certin \ -in data.tar.gz.sig > verified.hash
Compare your hash to the verified hash
diff -s verified.hash my.hash
Repeat 5 and 6 with metadata.gz
OpenSSL Reference The .pem files generated by –build and –sign are PEM files. Here’s a couple of useful OpenSSL commands for manipulating them:
# convert a PEM format X509 certificate into DER format: # (note: Windows .cer files are X509 certificates in DER format) $ openssl x509 -in input.pem -outform der -out output.der # print out the certificate in a human-readable format: $ openssl x509 -in input.pem -noout -text
And you can do the same thing with the private key file as well:
# convert a PEM format RSA key into DER format: $ openssl rsa -in input_key.pem -outform der -out output_key.der # print out the key in a human readable format: $ openssl rsa -in input_key.pem -noout -text
There’s no way to define a system-wide trust list.
custom security policies (from a YAML file, etc)
Simple method to generate a signed certificate request
Support for OCSP, SCVP, CRLs, or some other form of cert status check (list is in order of preference)
Support for encrypted private keys
Some sort of semi-formal trust hierarchy (see long-winded explanation above)
Path discovery (for gem certificate chains that don’t have a self-signed root) – by the way, since we don’t have this, THE ROOT OF THE CERTIFICATE CHAIN MUST BE SELF SIGNED if Policy#verify_root is true (and it is for the MediumSecurity and HighSecurity policies)
Better explanation of X509 naming (ie, we don’t have to use email addresses)
Honor AIA field (see note about OCSP above)
Honor extension restrictions
Might be better to store the certificate chain as a PKCS#7 or PKCS#12 file, instead of an array embedded in the metadata.
Flexible signature and key algorithms, not hard-coded to RSA and SHA1.
Paul Duncan <pabs@pablotron.org> pablotron.org/